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What is the New Russian Federalism?
Jeff Kahn
............................................................................ ............. . ....... ............... . ............................................. .-..... .
~

Observers of Russia's stumbling transition to democracy might be forgiven for regarding
successive promises of a 'new Russian federalism' with healthy scepticism. The centralizing
legacies of so-called Soviet federalism still cast a shadow over the rubble of the former Soviet
multinational state. Yeltsin's tightening grip on regional leaders following his violent but
victorious battle with parliament in October 1993 suggested plans for more centralized rule.
The new Constitution, the hard-fought prize of that battle, established tremendous powers
for the federal executive and left the division of powers between centre and periphery
purposefully ambiguous. The 'Parade of Sovereignties' that opened a new decade and closed
the old Soviet era was overstopped in its tracks by its initiator, Boris Yeltsin.
Russia's first president did not create his powerful, 'unified' federal state. By the mid199os, federal and regional authorities alike bemoaned the failure to create a cohesive state
system that could address mounting economic and social problems, although each side
proposed very different solutions. Soon after the referendum that narrowly ratified his
Constitution, Yeltsin launched a new parade. Signing treaties (dogovory) and agreements
(soglasheniya) with the executive heads of ethnic republics (and soon thereafter with oblasts
and krais), Yeltsin eroded the legal equality his Constitution proclaimed for different levels
of centre-periphery relations. Savvy regional negotiators won budget privileges, powers of
appointment, exemption from various federal requirements, and a tacit understanding that
federal officials-at least for the time being-would look away from glaring violations of the
federal Constitution and basic democratic principles.
With the sudden rise of Vladimir Putin, Russian federalism made another volte-face. The
ambiguous enforceability of Yeltsin's treaties-never ratified by legislatures-was made
clear by Putin's disregard for executive promises that no longer suited his interests. One of
Putin's first presidential decrees, signed days after his inauguration, divided Russia into
seven federal districts, each encompassing several republics, oblasts, and okrugs, and each
headed by a presidential enforcer tasked to maintain the supremacy of federal law. Lists were
rumoured to circulate in the Kremlin of regional leaders to be brought to heel. Putin
described his project as the 'dictatorship of law.'
What forces have influenced such sea-changes in Russian federal politics? How might
political scientists approach the dynamic of centre-periphery relations in a post-Soviet, and
now a post-Yeltsin, Russia? 1 Examination of the conceptual and political struggles to define
Chapter specially commissioned for this volume.
1
Chechnya (Ichkeriya) is not analysed here. The two wars fought thus far (conservatively estimated to have
killed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians) have largely removed the republic from federal politics. On 8
June 2000 Vladimir Putin issued an ukaz establishing direct presidential rule. Ukaz No 1071 , Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10
June 2000, p. 3.
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Russian federalism provides insights into the path of Russian federal development and
Russia's difficult democratic transition.

The spectrum of federal choices
In a country as large and multinational as Russia, it is unsurprising that renewed debates
about federalism coincided with systemic political reform in the late i98os. Federal
arrangements offer small polities the freedom of self-government combined with the economic and security advantages of a larger state. Federalism also appeals to large states
struggling with various forms of internal disharmony, but which value accommodating
their diversity within a more unitary framework. As A. V. Dicey expressed this 'very peculiar
state of sentiment', the citizens of a federation 'must desire union, and must not desire
unity'. 2 Ethnic or religious minorities may consider federalism the best available means of
cultural self-preservation, less risky than secession. There is seldom a single motivation;
many factors co-determine the prospects for federal governance.
Federalism is best viewed as a spectrum of possible ways to divide jurisdiction over the
same population between different levels of government. One of the best definitions of
federalism captures its dynamic: '[The federal principle is] the method of dividing powers
so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and
independent.' 3 But federalism is more than the sum of its definitional parts; indeed, that is
the very real goal a federal system is designed to achieve. Ivo Duchacek noted the importance of a 'federal political culture', a form of citizen loyalty to the federal polity that extends
above and beyond regional allegiances. Acceptance of the inevitability of multiple, overlapping political identities and the importance of ensuring their complementarity is crucial in a
federal system.
All federal systems rest upon a written, formal document, usually called a constitution,
that is the supreme law of the land, overriding all other legislation or executive acts. As Dicey
observed, federalism does away with the principle of the supreme sovereignty of parliament,
which is subordinated in a federal system to a written constitution. This is one important
distinction between federalism and the mere devolution of power, under which a parliament
granting greater authority to lower levels of government retains the legal right (though not
always the political ability) to revoke those powers later. An important difference between
federal and confederal systems lies in this sovereign power accorded constitutional law. In
confederations, established by treaty, the constituent units retain a far greater portion of
their sovereignty and give up far fewer areas of jurisdiction to the union government. At its
most extreme, a confederal programme may assert that the union government's proper role
is only as agent of the component states. Thus, states might selectively reject federal laws or
agency when they conflict with local laws and interests. This historically unstable 'doctrine
of nullification' interprets a constitution not as a founding legal document against which a
2

A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of tl1e Law of the Constitution, loth edn. (London: Macmillan,
141.
3
K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th edn. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 10. Compare William H.
Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation Significnnce (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), IL For an excellent and
detailed comparative analysis of federal systems, see Alfred Stepan, 'Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective', Post-Soviet Affairs, 16/2. (2000).
1967),
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constitutional court may adjudicate disputes impartially, but as a political compact always
open to political renegotiation. 4
In many ways, the doctrine of nullification, notions of federal political culture, and the
emphasis on a written constitution are different facets of a common theme: the problem of
establishing an agreed framework of federal objectives. These three issues and the conceptual problems they raise are omnipresent in the development of the new Russian federalism. A consensus on the inherent value of the federal project is crucial for its success. In
Russia, conceptual consensus has been conspicuous by its absence. This fundamental problem for the long-term stability of the Russian Federation can be traced back to debates about
sovereignty and federalism reopened in the mid-198os, underscored by the 'Parade of Sovereignties', and which continue today.

Conflict over the 'old' Russian federalism
The legacy of Soviet 'federalism' has exerted considerable influence on newer thinking.
Lenin's and Stalin's early policies gave institutional privileges to ethnic elites in order to win
allegiance to the Soviet state. The regime created what one scholar called the 'institutionalised monopoly on the public expression of ethnic identity'. 5 The map of Russia was redrawn
to create new nations with their own administrative regions-these political boundaries
have remained virtually unchanged. Early Soviet constitutions combined the language of
federalism with the reality of democratic centralism. Contrary to the federal principle that
certain spheres of authority remain the exclusive jurisdiction of each level of government,
early Soviet constitutions created the legal fiction of 'dual subordination': each executive
body was accountable both to its electorate and to the executive body higher in the hierarchy
of democratic centralism. As one constitutional scholar observed: '[W]hile centralism might
conceivably be reconciled with democracy it was entirely incompatible with local autonomy.... By coupling "horizontal" with "vertical" subordination it [dual subordination]
seemed to grant local authorities a measure of control over local affairs; by the same token,
however, it ensured that no part of such control was truly autonomous'. 6 Notions of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' federal relations have lingered in the post-Soviet federal vocabulary.
The contradictory rhetoric of Soviet federalism obstructed Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms,
in part through institutional structures that Zbigniew Brzezinski noted created 'institutional
vessels' for nationalist sentiment.7 Federal reform was relatively low on Gorbachev's agenda
until too late in his tenure as general secretary and Soviet president. Notes of Politburo
discussions show that Gorbachev often listed alternatives to federation but seldom suggested
any detailed plan of federal reform. 8 Few of his Politburo colleagues gained even that level of
enlightenment.
Outside the Politburo, suverenitet, federalizm, and pravovoe gosudarstvo (law-governed
4 Keith E. Whittington, 'The Political Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification
Debate as an Illustration of!nformal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change', Publius, 26/2 (1996).
5 Philip G. Roeder, 'Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization', World Politics, 43/2 (1991), 205.
6
Aryeh L. Unger, Co11stitutio11al Develop111e11t in the USSR: A G11ide to the Soviet Co11stitutio11s (New York: Pica
Press, 1981), 19.
7 Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Post-Communist Nationalism', Foreign Affairs, 68/5 (1989/90), 6.
8
A. B. Veber, V. T. Loginov, G. S. Ostroumov and A. S. Chernyaev, eds., Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit' (Moscow:
Izdatel'stvo 'Aprel'-85', 1995), 95.
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state) were much more popular terms. National movements discovered that such language
resonated well with their demands for greater economic and cultural autonomy. The ethnographer Yi.1lia11 Bromlci, the geographer Vladimir Sokolov, and others incautiously proposed territoda l rcdivisions of between th ree and iicty separate rcpublics. 9 Not everyone
supported federal so lutions. Vladimir Zhir.inovsky: ' How ca n the nationalilies cris is be
solved under these conditio ns? nly through fear. We need fear and a strnng patriotic
governmenli political life in the com1tTy must be frozen, all political parties forb idden, mid
all representative org<ms of power di banded, except for the president and his authori.sed
local representatives (governors [gubernatoryl, vkeregents [11amest11iki]-w hatever). Ali the
republics must be abol ished." 0
The conflation of federal with confederal approaches corresponded to conflicting objectives held by regional and Moscow-centred political elites. FederaJ authorities invariably
advocated 'unified' or 'vertical' approaches to federalism, viewing the system as a simple
hjerarchy or pyramid. Regiona l leaders naturally embraced those elements of federal theory
thal em phasized local contro l, excl usive ju1·isdictions, and protection from an intruding
ceolral authority. They advocated a very weak centre, while federal politicians rallied around
the slogan 'a strong centre and strong republics'. 11

Conflicting conceptions of the new Russian federalism
EXPECTATION: THE PARADE OF SOVEREIGNTIES

Debates on federalism took p.lace in a highly charged political e1wi.ronmen t, in newly elected
regional Supreme oviets and the First Russian ongress of People's Deputies, where de legalions of regional elites actively participated in debates over the Declaration of Sovereignty
that was issued by the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, soon to be the
Russian Federation) on 12 June t990. This Declaration (esf eciaJJy Article Nine, wbich 'confi rmed the need to broaden substan tially' the rights of federal sub-units), combined with
Yeltsin's politicaJ junket Lhrough key regions tha t stllilmer, was an obvious invitation for
regions to assert their own autonomy. Yeltsin's populist exhortation in Ta tarstan to ' take as
much independence as you can hold on to,' 12 one of the most qL1oted and inflammatory
statements of his career, deliberately focused on the element of federalism that most
appea led to regional elites-autonomy from centralized rule. Ye! Lsin deliberately sought to
weaken Gorbachev's power and increase his own support by galvanizing opposition to the
federal centre.
His p.lan worked, and the 'Parade of Sovereignties' played a key role in undermining late
attempts to reform Soviet 'federal ism.' 'lwenty-fo ur of the forty declarations of overeignty
were made by consti tuent units of the RSfoSR. Unlike union republics (Ukraine, Belarus,
~ ' lcphan Kux, 'Soviet Fedenilism,' Problems of Com111w1ism (M ar.-Apr. 1990), 9. Nicholas J. Lynn and Alexei V.
Novikov, 'Refederalizing Russia: Debntes on the ld~a of f'edcralism in Russia', Publius, 27/2 (1997}, 193. Gavriil
Popov, What is to be Done? {London; Centre for Research into Co mmuni st Economies, 1992), 26- 8, 48-9.
10
'Interetlmic Contradictions in Russin: The Strategy of Panics :ind Social Movenic11 ts (A l(ound lnble)', Russian
Politics and Law, 32/5 (1994), u-12. This round table was held in Moscow on 9 June 1992.
11
Draft 'General Principles' for self-government published by a Supreme Soviet working group, Pravda, 14 Mar.

1989, p. 2.
12

Yelena Chernobrovkina, Vechernaya kazan',

10

Aug. 1990, p. 1.
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Moldova, and the Baltic, Caucasian, and Central Asian states), autonomous republics
(ASSRs in Soviet parlance) within the RSFSR desired not independence as sovereign states
but respect for sovereignty within a renewed federation . Their declarations, remarkably
similar to one another, emphasized the supremacy of local over federal laws, and many went
on to declare separate republican citizenship, language rights, and exclusive ownership and
authority over economic resources on its territory. These documents contained the regional
conception of what the new Russian Federation should look like: a polity that took its orders
from its constituent members. Autonomy was to be privileged above all else. Yeltsin's gambit
did little but foment antagonism towards any central authority. Rather than encourage
compromise in the renegotiation of autonomy, Yeltsin encouraged a mindset which at the
time strengthened him against Union authorities (particularly Gorbachev) but left him
vulnerable to his own short-sighted exhortations when he became the embodiment of the
new 'Centre.'
NEGOTIATION: THE FEDERATION TREATY AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Unilateral declarations of sovereignty were of minor legal-constitutional significance within
the pre-existing Soviet system, but of enormous political significance. All ASSR declarations
shared at least one more clause in common: these declarations were the basis for negotiating
the Union Treaty for a renewed USSR and the Federation Treaty within the RSFSR. From the
regional perspective, particularly that of republics, the Federation Treaty was the next logical
step-a means to achieve the objectives expounded in these declarations. Such objectives
were not shared by federal elites, who acquiesced to republican assertions of sovereignty,
self-determination and even rights to secession as tolerable 'transitional devices' to maintain
territorial integrity as the system developed. 13 True to regional self-conceptions of sovereignty,
the first founding document to be negotiated was a treaty, not a constitution.
Central and regional elite conceptions of their common federal project starkly diverged.
One negotiator from Bashkortostan complained, 'Acquaintance with the draft Federation
treaty creates the impression that the authors strove to create a centralised, unitary state
under the pretext of the Russian Federation.' The role of the sovereign republics was 'not
more than the former guberniya of tsarist Russia. ' 14 The Federation Treaty that emerged was
a patchwork of three separate treaties (one for each level of the envisaged tripartite federal
hierarchy of republics, oblasts, and autonomous okrugs) and two protocols. 15 The signatory
republics saw the document as the keystone of a new federal order, a point they collectively
underscored by insisting on repeated references to it in the draft federal constitution. The
Federation Treaty officially acknowledged republican sovereignty, the right to selfdetermination and expressly prohibited federal intrusion into regional affairs, a long list of
jurisdictions and authorities. In addition, one protocol promised half of the seats in one of
the chambers of the proposed federal parliament to representatives of the ethnically defined
regions (republics and autonomous okrugs). 16
1
3 Lynn and Novikov, 'Refederalizing Russia' 191-2. Robert Sharlet, 'The Prospects for Federalism in Russian
Constitutional Politics', Publius, 24 (1994), 119.
' 4 Zufar Yenikeev, 'Proekt dogovora nas ne ustraivaet', Leninets, M2 138 (7644), 24 Nov. 1990, 2.
'5 R. G. Abdulatipov and L. F. Boltenkova, eds., Federativniy dogovor: Dokumenty. Kommentarii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Respublika', 1992) .
16
'Protokol k Federativnomu dogovoru', rep. in B. A. Strashun, Federal' noe konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossii:
Osnov11ye istochniki po sostoy"niyu 11n 15 sentyabrya i996 goda (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo NORMA, i996), 198-9.
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In addition to the protocols, a special appendix (prilozhenie) was signed exclusively for
one republic: Bashkortostan. At the eleventh hour, Bashkortostan threatened to walk out on
the negotiations, an act that would have collapsed the process given the refusal of two key
republics (T.1tarstan and Chechnya) to sign the Treaty. The appendix granted special exceptions and privileges exclusively to Bashkortostan: its legislative and judicial systems were
declared to be independent, assertions of independent statehood and the righl to certain
foreign relations acknowledged, and certain statements about L'epublican control of property were added.' 7 While it could be said that these special dispensations were nominal and
often merely a few shades different from powers provided by the Federation Treaty, the
Appendix established a powerful precedent from the outset of the 'renewed' Russian Federation: the ink was not yet dry on the Treaty before parochial bilateral exceptions to it were
being made. 18
The October 1993 shelling of the White House and arrest of Yeltsin's parliamentary
opponents left the Federation Treaty subordinated to Yeltsin's draft Constitution. 19 While
Articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution were nearly exact duplications of Articles I and II of
the Treaty (establishing exclusive federal and joint jurisdictions), Treaty Article III on
exclusive republican powers was omitted from the Constitution. The presumption that
republics possessed all powers not explicitly handed over to Lhe Pederation in the Treaty-a
111-ore confederal conception-was reversed by Article 73, which granted constituent units
only those remaining powers not claimed by federal au thorities. Republican sovereignty and
separate citizenship were no longer acknowledged.
NULLIFICATION: THE PARADE OF TREATIES

The Parade of Sovereignties developed a vocabulary and a mindset of provincial autonomy
well before attempts were made to develop sound federation-wide organizing principles.
Federation Treaty negotiations quickly fell hostage to tbat mind el as republi cs realized that
they could ignore the federal centre (Chech.nya and Tatarstan) or mal<e last-minute ultimatums (Bashkortostan and Sakha-Yi1kutia} with a fair degree of impunity. Republican
elites spoke in terms of 'treaty-constitutional' federal relations, implying their prerogatives
as sovereign subjects of international law. Federal actors insisted on 'constitution-treaty' based federalism, by which they meant the strong central power that had always dominated
centre-periphery relations in Russia. A vocabulary of federalism built on an interest in
multilateral, transparent, and equal relations was not of particular interest to either side.
Bilateralism, exceptionalism, and hierarchy were the emerging norms of Russian federal
politics.
A new phrase increasingly dominated regional conceptions of federalism-snizu vverkh,
'from the bottom up.' At its core was the notion that a federation really was not more than
the sum of its parts, each of which had an indissoluble sovereignty of its own. This principle
17
M. A. Aiupov et al., eds., Stanovlenie dogovornykh otnoshenii Respubliki Bashkortostan i Rossiyskoy Federatsii
(Ufa: Izdatel'sko-poligraficheskiy kompleks pri Sekretariate Gosudarstevennogo Sobraniya Respubliki Bashkortostan, 1997).
18
Bashkortostan was not the only republic to receive a special, long-term agreenienl in exchange for its signature. Between initialling the treaty on 14 March, and signing on 31 March 1992, the clia111ond-rich repu blic of SakhaYakutia sign ~d a lucrative diamond outpul agrecmenL with fe deral ;mlhor:ities.
9
' Section Two, Article i, §4. Ko111lit111siya Ro$siyskoy Fec/.:rnlsii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Os'-89', 1998).

380

JEFF KAHN

found expression at the highest levels of regional politics. 20 In Tatarstan, the phrase even
influenced republican law, passed weeks after the acceptance of a fiercely independent
republican Constitution, which appealed to the then Russian Federal Supreme Soviet to
construct 'treaty-constitutional relations' with the republic. 21
Republican constitutions based their legitimacy on many of the same principles found in
declarations of sovereignty, foremost of which was the principle that republican laws (by
virtue of state sovereignty) retained supremacy over federal legislation. A hierarchy implicit
in the treaty-constitutional approach raised republics above the federal government in all
matters save those explicitly transferred by the republics. This approach sounded less in
federal solutions and more in confederal ones. The federal approach was the reverse, summarized in 1994 by Yeltsin's then chief-of-staff Sergei Filatov: 'The most general trends are
the aspiration of the republic elites to represent the powers of the Russian Federation as the
sum of powers delegated by the components (this is notably characteristic of the constitutions of Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Sakha, Tatarstan, and Tuva). However, the powers of the
Russian Federation ensue from its own sovereignty as a single, integral federative state, and
they do not depend on the components.' 22
Yeltsin responded to regional assertions of sovereignty by beginning a new parade, the
Parade of Treaties. 'I have not renounced my formula,' he declared in the spring of 1994,
'Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.' 23 Tatarstan was the first republic to receive a
bilateral treaty, signed in February 1994 (although negotiations had taken several years).
Bilateral treaties were really several documents: a treaty (dogovor), establishing general principles, and a complement of agreements (sovershenie) that provided short-term (five-year)
concrete arrangements for budgetary, tax, personnel, and other relationships. Between 1994
and i998, forty-six of the eighty-nine subjects of the Federation signed bilateral treaties with
the federal executive.
The Parade of Treaties raised a number of serious questions for the future of Russian
federalism. First, the practice of overriding, supplementing, or amending centre-periphery
relations established in the federal Constitution highlighted the controversy and confusion
of 'treaty-constitutional' versus 'constitutional-treaty' approaches to federalism. How
important was the Constitution compared to a bilateral treaty? Second, it was unclear where
bilateral treaties should be placed in the hierarchy of laws established by the Constitution.
Bilateral treaties were never ratified by either federal or regional legislatures; they were
wholly executive-driven relationships, exclusively involving presidents, governors, and
prime ministers. This question of legality was further aggravated by the suspicion shared by
many regional leaders that, in addition to published treaties, secret agreements were also
negotiated. Third, apart from the content of bilateral treaties, the process of negotiation
entailed a certain brinkmanship: the best treaties were negotiated by regions with the power
20
Rashit Vagizov, a committee chairman in the Tatarstan Parliament, insisted that the voluntary delegation of
political power 'from the bottom up' was a core principle of federalism. Author's interview, 10 June 1997, Tatarstan
State Soviet, Kazan.
21
Tatar Law 'On the order introducing into action the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan', in Rafael'
Khakimov, ed., Belaya kniga Tatarstuna: put' k suverenitetu, 1990-1995 (Kazan: Tsentr gumanitarnykh proektov i
issledovanii, i996), 23-4.
22
'Filatov on Center-Region Constitutional Issues', FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia, 2 Sept. 1994, p. i9.
2
J Elena Tregubova, 'Boris Yel'tsin v Tatarii', Segodnya, 31 May 1994, p. 1.

WHAT IS THE NEW RUSSIAN FEDERALISM?

381

and nerve to withhold tax payments, boycott federal elections or otherwise exempt themselves from the federal polity.
The proliferation of treaties was accompanied by the adoption by republics and regions of
their own coJ1stilutions and charters. The so-called 'War of Laws,' coincident with the
parade of treaties, produced thousands oflaws and constihrtionaJ clauses that contradicted
the federal constitution and federal Jaw. The Ru sian Federa.Lion Ministry of Justice
a.trnow1ced in late i996 tha t nineteen out of twenty .. one republican constitutions violated
the federal Constitution. 24 Article Seven of the onstitution of the Republic of lngushetia
announced that a federal law was 'lawful' only to the extent that it did not violate the
'sovereign rights' of the rep ublic. A1·ticlc 41 of the onstitution of Sakha-Yakutia required
federal legislatio n to pass, vote iu the l wer chamber of the republican parliament before its
juri diction wouJcl be accepted in the republ ic. Other republics, for exam ple Adygeya and
Dagestan, reserved the right to suspend federal legislation, subject to var ying degrees of
arbitration.25 Despite the strong language of the federal Constitution and the small but
growing number of h igh court cases denouncing regional non-compliance and malfeasance,
republlcs c ntinued to seek alternatives to lhe federal framework, often openly defying it. 26
These are extraordinary claims for component states in a federal system, for they call into
question the very unified legal pace that is both a hallmark and a fundamental advantage of
federation. The pedls of nullification and the potential for the destruction of a federal civic
identity are very real.

Putin's way: towards a 'dictatorship of law'?
Yeltsin made weak attempts t restructure increasingly difficult relations. On 30 July 1999 a
new federal law came into force to regu late the bilaternl trea ly process. 27 The law reemp hasized the supremacy of federal laws a nd Constitution in the legal hierarchy, categorically stated the prin cip le of glasnost in treaty promulgation, and gave regions lhree years to
briiJg existing treatie into conformity with federal law. However, the law stopped short of
establishing the ratification of Lr~ties by federal and regional legislatures, requiring only
examination ( rassmotreniya) by the legislature prior to adoption. Given that no treaty had
been sigoed si nce June t998, the law seemed conspicuously late.
The inauguration of Vladimir Putin led to substru1tial change for Russi..111 federaLisnL Less
than a week after taking his oath of office, Puli.n issued a presidential. decree ( nkaz) on 'The
Status of the Plenipotentiary Representative of th e President in a Federal District'."8 The
24

Irina Nagornykh, 'Rcgiony stnviat na konfro ntat iyu', Scgodnya, 22 Nov. i996, p. 2.
Konstitur5ii Rcspublik v sosta ve Rossiysk'ay Fedem1sii, Vypusk 1 (Moscow: Izdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy,
lzvcsriia, 1995).
~ See e.g. 'Postanovlc1\.ie J<onstitutsionnogo Suda Rossi i,skoy Pccleratsii po delu o µrnvcrke konstitu lsionr1o~ti
, lucey 80, 92, 93 i 911 Konstitutsii Resp11l liki Ko mi i stat'i JI Znko1m .Resp11bliki Kami ot 31 okt iubryn 1994 i;od;1 "Ob
ort1anakh ispolnitcl'noy vlasti v RC$publike Ko mi" ·, 11.,miisknya g11zctr1, 31 Jan. 1998, p. •J; Alexander _flla11kenngel,
' l.ocn l Sclf-Governmcnt vs. State Administrntioi1: 'l11c U<lJ'nurti in Decision', Eni r li1ll'Ofiunt1Comt itr11.in1111/ Rcvit!w, 61
25

I (1!)1)7), )l.
T/ ZakQn 'O prin ts ipa kh i po riadke raigrnnicheniya prcd111etov vedc11 iya i polnomochii me7.hdu org1111ami
gosmlul'stvennoy vlasti llossiyskoy ~'edcr~tsi.i i organm11i gosudarstvennoy vlasti sub"tktov Ro~siyskoy Fedcratsii',
Solmuiia zak1111odatd's1 1m Rossiy>kuy Fetlerat:sii, 26 (18 June 1999), item 3176, pp. 5685-92.
28
Rossiyskaya gazeta, i6 May 2000, p. 5.
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decree divided Russia into seven fed eral districts to which Putin appointed plenipotentiary
representatives L oorclinate the activity offederal o rga ns, ensure Lhe observance offcdcral
laws and the confo rmity of regional laws to the federa l Constitution, and to suggest Lo the
presid nl the suspension nQn-co ufo rmin ~ legisl:ll ion and executive normative a ts. M re
11knzy so n fo llowed, declaring laws or executjve ord ers of some reg.ions in violation of
federal law and th erefore null and void.29 Boris Nemrsov, a form er govern or and leader of
the Union of Right Forces, recognized the key to Lhc decrees would lie in th caJjbre and
standing of the people appointed to head the new districts. If they were just 'run-of-the-mill
bureaucrats', then the whole new system would be 'nothing other than decorative'. 30 Putin's
choices indicated his resolve: five of the seven representatives were generals (including
Viktor Cherkesov, former deputy director of the FSB, and Petr Latyshev, former deputy
minister of the MVD).3'
Putin followed his ukaz with a salvo of proposals to reform the Federation Council and
give him the power to dismiss recalcitrant executives, legislatures, and local government
officials throughout the Federation. 32 Eugene Huskey, earlier in this volume (Chapter 6),
analyses these bills, all three of which were signed in to law after difficult passage through the
Federal Assembly. 33 Putin's apparent victory, however, presents serious concerns of executive
overreach, tipping an already fragile balance of the separation of powers (not only between
branches of government but also between federal and regional levels of government) .
Although the Constitution is vague regarding who constitutes the 'representatives' that
compose the upper chamber, many politicians and lawyers protested that such extensive
reforms required full-blown constitutional amendment, not mere legislation. 34 A transfer of
power from the Federation Council to a proposed 'State Council' under the executive
branch would almost certainly require such amendment. Nikolai Fedorov, president of the
republic of Chuvashia and an outspoken critic of the reforms, led other senators to begin an
appeal to the Constitutional Court, contending that 'all honest lawyers admit that these
reforms and laws are essentially revising the existing constitutional structure of the Russian
Federation .. .'. 35
One month after Putin's initial reform package, the federal Constitutional Court issued a
Determination ( Opredelenie) on the constitutions of Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia,
Komi, N. Ossetia, and Tatarstan. 36 This highly critical document rejected the claims to
sovereignty (several bordering on the doctrine of nullification) made by these republics over
the past decade. The decision of the Court-a court of discretionary jurisdiction-at such a
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29 See e.g. an uki&
15 May suspending a resolution levying fines by the head of Smolen.sk oblas t as a violation
of federal law. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 May 2000, p. 4. Other early decrees tnrgetcd nUcged violations by Aclygeya,
Ingushetia, Amur, and Tver.
3o Segodnya, 16 May 200 0 , p. 4.
31
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 52'20 (2000) : 2- 4. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 20 May 2000, p. 3. Segodnya, 31
May 2000, pp. 1-2.
2
3 Original proposals published in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 May 2000, pp. 4-5 .
33 The Fecle.rn tion C',o uncil predictably vetoed its own proposed dissolution and the federal executive power to
dismiss governo'rs. Wh ile in the latter case, the Duma overrode that veto with a 1:3 maj ority, a special conciliation
commission was necessary to pass the amended Federation Council reform. Local government reform, Putin's third
prong, provoked comparatively less controversy.
3 4 RF Constitution, Art. 95, ss 2 .
35 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 4/148 Part 1, 3 Aug. 2000, 36.
36
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charged moment in Russian politics was viewed by some a a politic{! [ warning as mu h a a
lega l rul.ing. 1b olhers the Omt's decision was unimportant. A senior official of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bashkortostan i.n Mo cow observed (o a condition of
anonymity): 'In Russia, the polltical process ls more important than the law itself. So the
agreements of our president with the Russian Federation president are more impo.rtanl than
the law. The Cons t·itutional Court of Russia is just a body, hi ghly respected, but j11st a body
of the Russian Federation. It has nothing to do with the Republic ofBashkortostau-we have
our own Constitutional Court.' 37 In Tatarstan, Tat;u· nationalists presented that republic's
parliament and president with a bill declaring the decision invalid on its territory. 38
Of course, such thinking is not new, but part of the ong ing, sometimes s~hlzor hren.ic,
conceptual batlie over basic principles of federalism. The latest attempt at reform draws
from that legacy as rnuch as it continues it. The future of the 'new Russian federalism'
depends in large part on what balance can be struck between vafol a ·sertious of regional
autonomy and federa l obligations to promote and protect democratic principles and a
unified legal space rlrroughout the count1y. As ne respected legal scholar bserved, Putin's
federal reforms 'unwittingly u11leashed. a war', the re olution of which will not be quick and
the outcome of which is impossible to predict. 39
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Boris Bronshtein, 'Vosstanovit' nezavi simost' ', Izvestiya (online), 9 Aug. 20 0 0 .
39 William Smirnov, prominent political scientist and lawyer, Institute of Swee and I.aw. Author's interview,
Moscow, 13 July 2000.
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